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The Arc of Monopoly:  
A Case Study in Computing* 
Randal C. Picker† 
The world we live in today is defined by three great arcs. The first is the world 
of semiconductors and the innovation characterized by Moore’s law, the second is 
the creation of ubiquitous wireless access, and the third is the emergence of the in-
ternet platform. In that context, this Essay looks at government claims of monopoli-
zation in telecommunications and computing by considering past antitrust actions 
against AT&T, IBM, and Microsoft. Early antitrust actions against AT&T and IBM 
of course long predated the rise of the Chicago School, but later actions against 
AT&T and IBM overlapped that rise as did the antitrust actions against Microsoft. 
These antitrust actions intersected with and influenced these three arcs, though teas-
ing out the precise nature of that influence is ultimately quite tricky. 
INTRODUCTION 
“The Chicago School.” I am not sure that I know what that 
means exactly. It is often used to refer to the body of ideas in eco-
nomics and antitrust associated with economists and lawyers at 
the University of Chicago. As to antitrust proper, if one had to 
choose a single text associated with the Chicago School—a bible 
as it were, and there is no question that some of this undertak-
ing is about faith and belief in a world of incomplete facts and 
complex historical paths—a natural choice for that would be 
then-Professor Robert Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at 
War with Itself. Bork’s influential work was originally published 
in 1978 and then reissued in 1993 with a new introduction and 
epilogue. 
The new 1993 material gave Bork a chance to look back at 
what the Chicago School had accomplished. In his 1993 introduc-
tion, Bork described the Chicago School as centered on two ideas: 
judges should use a conception of consumer welfare in deciding 
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antitrust cases and they should do that analysis using economics.1 
In the new epilogue, Bork made clear that he didn’t have a narrow 
conception of consumer welfare: “The argument of this book, of 
course, is that competition must be understood as the maximiza-
tion of consumer welfare or, if you prefer, economic efficiency.”2 
So perhaps the Chicago School is nothing more than using eco-
nomics in pursuit of economic efficiency. I am not quite sure what 
it says about the book’s current status—or perhaps about eco-
nomic efficiency—that the book is currently out of print and you 
should expect to pay between $100 and $170 for a used copy. 
In the new 1993 introduction, Bork was quite pleased by the 
success of the Chicago School: “Today, antitrust has been down-
sized. It is merely law, not a farrago of amorphous and leftist po-
litical and sociological propositions.”3 I had to look up “farrago”—
“a confused mixture”—but I had already guessed that it wasn’t a 
compliment. At a more granular level, the Chicago School didn’t 
do any real conceptual downsizing on how to think about illegal 
horizontal cartels that violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Bork 
clearly thought that part of the success of the Chicago School 
analysis—the downsizing—occurred in vertical restraint cases 
under Section 1, perhaps most exemplified by the Supreme 
Court’s 1977 decision in GTE Sylvania4 and the eventual follow-
on in 2007 in Leegin.5 And I think Bork thought downsizing had 
occurred in merger policy, in which he saw as failures earlier de-
cisions like Brown Shoe6 and Von’s.7 
That quick doctrinal summary skips Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act on monopolization by a single firm. When Bork published his 
book in 1978, the Department of Justice (DOJ) had Section 2 
cases pending against IBM and AT&T. The IBM case was filed in 
1969, the AT&T case in 1974. Given the size and success of the 
companies, these were two of the leading Section 2 cases of their 
era. In 1978, Bork seemed to be skeptical about both suits and 
said more generally that “government suits seeking structural 
remedies [were] not soundly based in either law or economics.”8 
 
 1 Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself xi (Free Press 
2d ed 1993). 
 2 Id at 427. 
 3 Id at x. 
 4 Continental T.V., Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc, 433 US 36 (1977). 
 5 Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v PSKS, Inc, 551 US 877 (2007). 
 6 Brown Shoe Co v United States, 370 US 294 (1962). 
 7 United States v Von’s Grocery Co, 384 US 270 (1966). 
 8 Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 163 (cited in note 1). 
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Bork believed that size achieved through internal growth clearly 
was efficient and that therefore some type of breakup would nec-
essarily create less efficient firms.9 By the time of the 1993 epi-
logue, both cases had been resolved, one with a dismissal and one 
with a breakup. And Bork believed that both cases had been re-
solved correctly, though his analysis was quite brief.10 
But if Bork was right that antitrust had been downsized, 
there are ways in which the most dramatic downsizing might be 
regarding Section 2 and how the government controls monopoli-
zation. In the 1990s, the Antitrust Division filed nine civil Sec-
tion 2 cases.11 It filed no such cases from 2000 to 2009.12 And be-
tween 2010 and 2018, it filed one such case.13 So ten cases total 
between 1990 and 2018 and only one after 1999. The number of 
Section 2 investigations has witnessed a similarly dramatic de-
cline; while the Antitrust Division averaged almost eleven inves-
tigations per year in the 1990s, over the past decade the depart-
ment has averaged fewer than two.14 This isn’t mere shrinkage 
of the DOJ’s Section 2 docket, but instead a quantum-level 
downsizing. 
I want to look at the downsizing of monopolization and to do 
so through the development of one particular market: computing. 
That market was still young in 1978 when Bork published The 
Antitrust Paradox. The two great tech cases were pending, but 
the personal computer was presumably barely visible to Bork, 
and he had no sense of the world that we live in today. That world 
is really defined by the intersection of three great technical devel-
opments: semiconductor technology and Moore’s law, ubiquitous 
wireless access, and an all-encompassing data and communica-
tions platform: the internet. It is worth sketching out in broad 
terms how we have reached this point and the role that Section 2 
 
 9 Again, Bork: “Antitrust should not interfere with any firm size created by internal 
growth, and this is true whether the result is monopoly or oligopoly.” Id at 178. And in the 
1993 epilogue: “Breaking up such a firm would do more harm than good to consumers.” Id 
at 430. 
 10 Id at 431. 
 11 Department of Justice, Antitrust Division Workload Statistics FY 1990–1999 *5 
(June 9, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/89HT-LF92. 
 12 Department of Justice, Antitrust Division Workload Statistics FY 2000–2009 *6 
(Apr 4, 2012), archived at https://perma.cc/FED9-PYCN. 
 13 Department of Justice, Antitrust Division Workload Statistics FY 2009–2018 *6 
(July 1, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/A8N7-6CMH. 
 14 Antitrust Division Workload Statistics FY 1990–1999 at *1 (cited in note 11); An-
titrust Division Workload Statistics FY 2009–2018 at *1 (cited in note 13). 
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of the Sherman Act—and its equivalent in Europe—has played or 
failed to play in creating those developments. 
Section 2’s instruction to control monopolization might be 
used most naturally to shape competition within a given current 
market; to police competition in adjacent markets when a domi-
nant firm might seek to use its market position to distort compe-
tition in a market related to the original market; and to control 
competition for the next market—competition over time—where 
the fear is that the incumbent will use its current position to its 
advantage to distort competition in the new coming market. 
The success or failure of Section 2 in computing should be 
judged as to how it has shaped or failed to shape competition in 
current markets, in adjacent markets, and in future markets. The 
balance of this Essay will try to do just that in looking at a series 
of antitrust actions in computing and telecommunications. The 
fact that Section 2 enforcement has in some ways shut down since 
the 1990s means that, save for the Microsoft cases, much of the 
relevant landscape was available to Bork even in 1978 and cer-
tainly by 1993. 
That is to say that I will focus on the US government’s settle-
ments in 1956 with AT&T and IBM, the 1969 antitrust suit 
against IBM, the 1974 suit against AT&T, the 1994 and 1998 ac-
tions against Microsoft in the United States, and the actions 
against Microsoft in Europe in the 2000s. Microsoft really is the 
antitrust bridge from the earlier era suits against IBM and AT&T 
to whatever will come next. Even Google, facing three different 
fines in Europe totaling $9.4 billion, is still in many ways at the 
early days, with appeals pending and public opinions still not 
available in two of the three European Commission (EC) cases.15 
As to the rest of the leading firms, in May 2019, the US Su-
preme Court issued an opinion in a case brought against Apple 
that will make it easier for individual customers to sue platforms 
 
 15 William Gallagher, Google up to $9.4 Billion in Total Fines to EU, with Latest $1.7 
Billion AdSense Penalty (AppleInsider, Mar 20, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/F5ML 
-HQL7; European Commission, Press Release, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €1.49 
Billion for Abusive Practices in Online Advertising (Mar 20, 2019), archived at 
https://perma.cc/SRV5-74W7. 
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for alleged antitrust violations;16 plus, there are other possible in-
vestigations against Apple, but again this is all quite early still.17 
The German cartel office has issued an antitrust ruling regarding 
how Facebook combines data internally, though that is currently 
on appeal in the German court system, and there is a pending US 
Federal Trade Commission investigation into Facebook.18 And the 
EC opened a formal investigation on how Amazon operates its 
platform and uses the data of third-party retailers.19 There is no 
question that how to think about regulating these firms is very 
much on the table, and that makes this a particularly good time to 
revisit the prior antitrust path in computing and communications. 
I.  A SHORT HISTORY OF TODAY 
Three great arcs define the world of computing and commu-
nications that we live in today. The first was the rise of computing 
power itself, from the vacuum tube machines of World War II to 
the world of semiconductors defined by Moore’s law. The second 
great arc was the move from expensive wired communications 
dominated by AT&T and the rest of the Bell System to ubiquitous, 
cheap wireless communication. And the third was the creation of 
the Internet and its evolution from an arcane academic network 
to the universal data and communications platform of today. 
A short version of the history of the rise of computing power 
would almost certainly start with World War II, though that 
would ignore an important earlier world of analog computers that 
certainly shaped how the creators of the new digital machines un-
derstood what they were doing. Digital computing using vacuum 
 
 16 See Apple Inc v Pepper, 139 S Ct 1514, 1525 (2019) (explaining that “[i]t is true 
that Apple’s alleged anticompetitive conduct may leave Apple subject to multiple suits by 
different plaintiffs”). 
 17 See, for example, Rochelle Toplensky, Brussels Poised to Probe Apple over Spotify’s 
Fees Complaint (Financial Times, May 6, 2019), online at https://www.ft.com/ 
content/1cc16026-6da7-11e9-80c7-60ee53e6681d (visited Jan 27, 2020) (Perma archive 
unavailable); Jack Nicas, Russia Opens Antitrust Inquiry into App Restriction at Apple 
(NY Times, Aug 9, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/Z46R-844D. 
 18 Bundeskartellamt, Press Release, Bundeskartellamt Prohibits Facebook from 
Combining User Data from Different Sources (Feb 7, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/ 
5T4G-CBNE; Natasha Lomas, Facebook Succeeds in Blocking German FCO’s Privacy-
Minded Order Against Combining User Data (TechCrunch, Aug 26, 2019), archived at 
https://perma.cc/ZSE7-K6N3; Mike Isaac and Natasha Singer, Facebook Antitrust Inquiry 
Shows Big Tech’s Freewheeling Era Is Past (NY Times, July 24, 2019), archived at 
https://perma.cc/C9LF-GU86. 
 19 European Commission, Press Release, Antitrust: Commission Opens Investigation 
into Possible Anti-Competitive Conduct of Amazon (July 17, 2019), archived at 
https://perma.cc/FXV9-JE5F. 
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tubes emerged in World War II, most visibly with the public 
demonstration by the US War Department of ENIAC (the elec-
tronic numerical integrator and computer) on February 14, 
1946.20 Much less visibly, the British had achieved great success 
with their Colossus cryptography machines, which were also 
based on vacuum tubes, and Konrad Zuse had pursued a similar 
path during the war for Germany.21 
The nature of historical inquiry is that causality is compli-
cated, sometimes overdetermined, and it is almost always impos-
sible to see the world that would have resulted had an alternative 
path played out. The digital computers that emerged in World 
War II reflected, at least in part, the nascent work being done be-
fore the war, especially by Professor John Atanasoff at Iowa State 
University, but it seems likely that the substantial resources 
brought to bear during World War II moved the path of digital 
computing forward much faster than it would have otherwise.22 
The concentrated war effort put in place the new, much higher 
basecamp from which the next step in computing would emerge, 
even if that path linked back naturally to the baby steps that had 
been taken before the war.23 
The next step was clearly the move to semiconductors and the 
invention of the transistor at Bell Labs. John Bardeen and Walter 
Brattain demonstrated what we now know as the point-contact 
transistor on Christmas Eve 1947, and William Shockley quickly 
followed that with the invention of the junction transistor in 
January 1948.24 Computing has been based on semiconductors 
ever since then, as transistors turned into integrated circuits and 
then into microprocessors. The great arc of computing power was 
a world defined by the relentless pace of change set by Moore’s 
 
 20 Robot Calculator Knocks Out Figures Like Chain Lightning, Chi Daily Trib 1 (Feb 
15, 1946). 
 21 See Martin Campbell-Kelly, et al, Computer: A History of the Information Machine 
37, 42 (Westview 3d ed 2013). 
 22 See generally, for example, Brian Randell, On Alan Turing and the Origins of Dig-
ital Computers (University of Newcastle upon Tyne Computing Laboratory Technical Re-
port Series No 33, 1972), archived at https://perma.cc/9PZB-CCPG. 
 23 Unsurprisingly, there are many books on the history of computers. On Atanasoff 
in particular, see generally Jane Smiley, The Man Who Invented the Computer: The Biog-
raphy of John Atanasoff, Digital Pioneer (Doubleday 2010). 
 24 Jon Gertner, The Idea Factory: Bell Labs and the Great Age of American Innova-
tion 93–96 (Penguin 2012); William Shockley, The Invention of the Transistor—An Exam-
ple of “Creative-Failure Methodology”, in Florence Essers and Jacob Rabinow, eds, The 
Public Need and the Role of the Inventor: Proceedings of a Conference Held in Monterey, 
California June 11–14 1973 47–87 (National Bureau of Standards 1974). 
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law, described by Gordon Moore in 1965 as an empirical regu-
larity within the world of semiconductors.25 Improvements in 
transistor density were exponential—doubling over a defined pe-
riod—and that drove each succeeding computer generation, from 
mainframes to minicomputers to microcomputers (personal com-
puters) and then to the handheld smartphones we have today.26 
The second great arc that defines today was the move from 
expensive wired communications dominated by AT&T and the 
Bell System to ubiquitous wireless communication. The future ar-
rived on April 3, 1973, when Martin Cooper, a Motorola vice pres-
ident, made the first portable phone call, though there was no 
easy way to see the world of today from that first phone call.27 
More than a year later, on November 20, 1974, the US govern-
ment brought an antitrust suit against AT&T, and the govern-
ment made clear from the outset that it wanted to break “Ma Bell” 
into pieces.28 Quite remarkably, on January 9, 1982, AT&T agreed 
to settle the case with a breakup.29 By August 1983, the US gov-
ernment and AT&T had agreed on the structure of the firms that 
would be formed from the breakup.30 By the end of 1984, there 
were fewer than one hundred thousand portable phone subscrib-
ers in the United States.31 
The breakup of AT&T was almost immediately directed at 
boosting competition in the market for long-distance phone calls.32 
 
 25 Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits, 38 Elec-
tronics 114, 115 (Apr 19, 1965) (describing “the production of larger and larger circuit 
functions on a single semiconductor substrate” year by year). 
 26 See id at 115–16. See also Tom Simonite, Moore’s Law is Dead. Now What? (MIT 
Technology Review, May 13, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/HAL9-LY8A. 
 27 See Joseph Egelhof, Motorola Unveils New Radio-Phone, Chi Trib 87 (Apr 4, 1973); 
Gene Smith, Motorola Introduces Wire-Less Telephone, NY Times 57 (Apr 4, 1973); Press 
Release, Motorola Demonstrates Portable Telephone to Be Available for Public Use by 1976 
(Motorola, Apr 3, 1973), archived at https://perma.cc/BNW9-ED5N. 
 28 See Eileen Shanahan, U.S. Sues to Divest A.T.&T. of Western Electric; Conspiracy 
Is Charged, NY Times 1, 68 (Nov 21, 1974) (noting that “[a]mong the items of relief envi-
sioned in the suit are the splitting of Western Electric . . . . [Assistant Attorney General] 
Clearwaters said that he felt such an action could aid competition”). 
 29 See Ernest Holsendolph, U.S. Settles Phone Suit, Drops I.B.M. Case;  
A.T.&T. to Split Up, Transforming Industry (NY Times, Jan 9, 1982), archived at 
https://perma.cc/M2K5-PQRK. 
 30 See Andrew Pollack, A.T.&T., U.S. Agree on Final Aspects of Bell Breakup (NY 
Times, Aug 4, 1983), archived at https://perma.cc/WM8J-6NPW. 
 31 In the Matter of Implementation of Section 6002(B) of the Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act of 1993: Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with 
Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, 10 FCC Rec 8844, 8874 (1995). 
 32 See Andrew Pollack, Bell System Breakup Opens Era of Great Expectations and 
Great Concern (NY Times, Jan 1, 1984), archived at https://perma.cc/PW2T-QYW4 (noting 
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Yet the breakup may have mattered most when the FCC moved 
to change wireless communications. On October 25, 1991, the 
FCC announced a policy statement and order on what it was de-
scribing as a new type of wireless personal communications ser-
vices.33 The world of wireless communications, still very much in 
its infancy at the time of the breakup of AT&T, would soon start 
to expand rapidly as the FCC held a series of spectrum auctions 
to provide the key infrastructure for the development of an ex-
panded set of wireless services.34 By the end of 1994, there were 
roughly twenty-four million now-cellular subscribers in the 
United States,35 but the real spectrum big bang occurred at the 
end of 1994 and into early 1995 when the FCC auctioned off 
ninety-nine spectrum licenses for a total price of just over $7 bil-
lion.36 Absent the breakup of AT&T, AT&T clearly would have 
been the leading potential buyer of this new spectrum, but with 
the breakup, each of the RBOCs—the regional Bell operating 
companies—were competitors of AT&T in the bidding.37 By the 
end of 2016, there were roughly 400 million US wireless connec-
tions.38 (The number of US landline connections peaked at 
roughly 192.4 million at the end of 2000 and has been dropping 
since.39) 
The third great innovation was the Internet and the particu-
lar version of it that arose with the World Wide Web. The Octo-
ber 4, 1957 launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union was a great 
technical achievement and a public relations triumph that forced 
 
that, under the agreement, “[s]everal networks will be competing with the new A.T.&T. to 
carry long-distance calls” and “the increasing competition spurred by the Bell breakup is 
expected to speed [ ] up” innovations in the industry). 
 33 See In the Matter of Amendment of the Commission’s Rules to Establish New Per-
sonal Communications Services, 6 FCC Rec 6601, 6601 (1991). 
 34 See In the Matter of Implementation of Section 6002(B), 10 FCC Rec at 8860 (cited 
in note 31). 
 35 See id at 8874. 
 36 See FCC, Auction 4: Broadband PCS A and B Block (1995), archived at 
https://perma.cc/8F6Q-D3DV. 
 37 See FCC, Auction 4: Broadband PCS A and B Block: Bidder Activity by Dollar 
Value of High Bids (1995), archived at https://perma.cc/U7GX-RSQ5 (showing that 
Ameritech Wireless Communications, Pacific Telesis Mobile Services, and Southwestern 
Bell Mobile Systems all had high bids). 
 38 The State of Wireless 2018 (CTIA, July 10, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/ 
BJZ8-WSNE. 
 39 See FCC, Local Telephone Competition: Status as of December 31, 2009 *13 (Jan 
2011), archived at https://perma.cc/4Q3B-H25C (Table 1). 
2020] The Arc of Monopoly 531 
 
the United States to respond.40 The US military had been cutting 
back on military research but quickly reversed course given the 
Soviet achievement.41 A new intrabranch research arm, the Ad-
vanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was created.42 J.C.R. 
Licklider had come to ARPA in October 1962 and was confronted 
with the problem of how ARPA could best coordinate the computing 
power that it was seeding throughout the country. In an April 23, 
1963 memo, Licklider proposed a network of computers each “netted 
together” through some sort of common computer language.43 
By December 1969, a four-node network—the ARPANET—
was up and running.44 At the time, it wasn’t at all clear what 
ARPANET would turn into, but we now know that it would be-
come the Internet and then the internet. There is a rich history 
associated with that, of course, but to just have a date or two in 
mind and then jump forward nearly two decades, note that Tim 
Berners-Lee submitted a proposal in March 1989 to CERN for 
what Berners-Lee described as a “mesh” system for linking to-
gether hypertext information.45 In early 1993, Berners-Lee’s back 
end was matched with a front end, Mosaic.46 The new software, 
an Internet web browser, was developed at the National Center 
for Supercomputing Applications at the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign.47 Marc Andreessen was one of the key devel-
opers of Mosaic; when his new company, Netscape, went public 
on August 9, 1995, the Internet boom was on.48 
 
 40 See, for example, John W. Finney, Economy Campaign Halts Plans for New Mili-
tary Research Projects: Scientists Warn of Peril to U.S., NY Times 13 (Oct 9, 1957) (report-
ing that “[s]cientific concern has been heightened by the technological strides being made 
by the Soviet Union, as exemplified in the launching of man’s first earth satellite”).  
 41 See id. See also James Reston, Arms: A Progress Report, NY Times 32 (Dec 6, 1957) 
(reporting that “[t]he new United States missiles budget will be up about $2,000,000,000, 
representing an increase of one-third in the missile program,” some of which will be used 
on a “planned expansion of the warning system”). 
 42 See Reston, Arms: A Progress Report, NY Times at 32 (cited in note 41). 
 43 See J.C.R. Licklider, Topics for Discussion at the Forthcoming Meeting *3 (Ad-
vanced Research Projects Agency, Apr 23, 1963), archived at https://perma.cc/JCT5-846G. 
 44 Bolt Beranek and Newman, Inc, A History of the ARPANET: The First Decade 
III-77 (BBN Report No 4799, Apr 1981). 
 45 Tim Berners-Lee, Information Management: A Proposal (World Wide Web Consor-
tium, Mar 1989), archived at https://perma.cc/LS9K-XGT9. 
 46 See John Markoff, Business Technology; A Free and Simple Computer Link (NY 
Times, Dec 8, 1993), archived at https://perma.cc/Z6FG-ZD7A. 
 47 See Tim Anderson, Mosaic Turns 20: Let’s Fire up the Old Girl, Show Her the Web 
Today (The Register, Apr 26, 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/3ZZS-SMH8. 
 48 See Molly Baker and Joan E. Rigdon, Netscape’s IPO Gets an Explosive Welcome, 
Wall St J C1 (Aug 9, 1995). 
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II.  ANTITRUST AND THE DAWN OF THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY 
In 1913, AT&T faced two separate channels of attack from 
the US government: one a possible antitrust suit, and the second 
a push by the US Postmaster General to bring the telegraph and 
telephone under the control of the federal government to create a 
unified communications system with the US Post Office.49 AT&T 
navigated those threats by “voluntarily” agreeing in the Kingsbury 
commitment to spin off its recent acquisition of Western Union, 
one of the great telegraph firms of its era, and by agreeing to cre-
ate a variety of interconnection rights with firms that wanted to 
access AT&T’s lines.50 AT&T survived all of that very nicely, as 
by 1917, US Steel was by far and away the largest public US firm 
by market cap with a value of $46.4 billion in 2017 dollars, while 
AT&T was number two with a value of $14.1 billion.51 
After World War II, AT&T would again face an antitrust 
threat from the US government, this time realized when the gov-
ernment brought an antitrust action against AT&T on Janu-
ary 14, 1949.52 US Attorney General Tom C. Clark made clear 
that the size and organization of AT&T made it almost impossible 
for state and federal regulators to control it.53 AT&T and its oper-
ating entities were regulated under conventional public utility–
style regulation, which focused on a rate of return based on the 
cost of operations. But Western Electric, AT&T’s manufacturing 
company, stood outside of those regulations, and the fear was that 
the operating companies were paying inflated rates in an effort to 
evade the effects of standard rate regulation.54 The solution to 
that problem was to, again, break up AT&T by forcing it to divest 
its interest in Western Electric.55 
On January 24, 1956, the case settled.56 AT&T would not be 
broken up, but it would agree to license its existing patents royalty-
 
 49 See Telephone Trust to Dissolve, Giving Up Western Union Control: Government 
Accepts an Offer of Complete Separation, NY Times 1 (Dec 20, 1913). 
 50 See id at 2. 
 51 See A Century of America’s Top 10 Companies, in One Chart (howmuch.net, Nov 
14, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/4SVJ-UX3L. 
 52 See John B. Owen, Suit Attacks AT&T as Monopoly, Wash Post 1 (Jan 15, 1949). 
 53 See id (featuring a quote from Attorney General Clark in which he explains that a 
breakup would “create a situation under which State and Federal regulatory commissions 
will be afforded an opportunity to reduce telephone rates to subscribers”). 
 54 See Charles Zerner, U.S. Sues to Force A.T.&T. to Drop Western Electric Co, NY 
Times 1, 3 (Jan 15, 1949). 
 55 See id. 
 56 See generally Consent Decree, United States v Western Electric Co, Civil Action 
No 17-49, *71,134 (D NJ 1956). 
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free and its future patents at reasonable and nondiscriminatory 
rates, plus AT&T would be quarantined.57 AT&T would operate 
in the communications business, but it was barred from entering 
new fields, including, most relevantly, the computer industry.58 
The government characterized the settlement as “one of the most 
important” in US antitrust history,59 though after the fact, the 
settlement was seen as more controversial.60 
Assessing the exact causal role of the 1956 AT&T antitrust 
settlement—or final judgment, as it was called—is tricky. AT&T 
had an active practice of licensing its patents and had started 
holding symposia and licensing its transistor patents in 1951 and 
1952.61 That licensing presumably reflected the idea that a single 
firm might not be well situated to fully exploit the full range of 
possible inventions associated with a particular invention.62 
AT&T also had obligations under military contracts to dissemi-
nate information about the transistor to the military.63 AT&T also 
might have been licensing the patents as part of managing the 
pending antitrust case. All of that suggests that AT&T’s licensing 
of the transistor patents was overdetermined. The 1956 antitrust 
settlement reduced the royalty rate on the presettlement patents, 
including the transistor patents, to zero, but a detailed look at the 
case suggests that the price drop didn’t change actual use of the 
transistors.64 What really mattered was assured access to the new 
 
 57 See id at *71,139. 
 58 See id at *71,137. 
 59 See Anthony Lewis, A.T.&T. Settles Antitrust Case; Shares Patents, NY Times 1 
(Jan 25, 1956). 
 60 See, for example, Lawrence A. Sullivan and Ellen Hertz, The AT&T Antitrust Con-
sent Decree: Should Congress Change the Rules?, 5 High Tech L J 233, 236 (1990) (noting 
that, in the years following the 1956 consent decree, the FCC was “deluged by complaints” 
from equipment manufacturers claiming that AT&T refused to purchase their goods and 
that, by the 1970s, it was clear the overwhelmed Commission struggled to prevent AT&T 
from limiting competitive incursions). 
 61 See Martin Watzinger, et al, How Antitrust Enforcement Can Spur Innovation: 
Bell Labs and the 1956 Consent Decree *30 (working paper, Feb 12, 2019), archived at 
https://perma.cc/UE49-LKFW. 
 62 See Keith S. McHugh, Bell System Patents and Patent Licensing, Bell Telephone 
Magazine 217, 218 (Winter 1948–49) (explaining that “[i]n order to realize the value of the 
inventions, it is necessary to employ different types of patent license agreements in differ-
ent situations”). 
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technology in an easy way, so the small post–consent decree re-
duction in royalties appears to have had little further impact on 
use of the new transistor.65 
Whatever the reason for ready availability of AT&T’s new 
and important transistor technology, there seems little doubt that 
the widespread availability of AT&T’s transistor patents and 
knowhow mattered for the development of semiconductors. Firms 
like Texas Instruments and Fairchild Semiconductor were able to 
take important steps forward into silicon transistors and eventu-
ally integrated circuits that might have been prevented had 
AT&T’s early transistor patents been given their full blocking 
force or if AT&T had kept everything in-house.66 And the business 
line quarantine may have mattered for how the computer indus-
try evolved. 
But we need to fill in one more chunk of the history before 
considering that possibility. On January 25, 1956—the day after 
the US government announced its settlement of the AT&T anti-
trust case—the government announced a settlement of its pend-
ing antitrust case against IBM.67 The fact that the government 
had a case pending against IBM is noteworthy given the prior 
success that the government had had in suing IBM. In late March 
1932, the US government brought an antitrust suit against IBM 
and Remington Rand alleging that the two firms dominated the 
tabulating equipment market through patent cross-licensing and 
by forcing their customers to buy tabulating cards from the same 
firm that made the tabulating equipment.68 At that time, IBM 
held 88 percent of the market and Rand the balance.69 The gov-
ernment won in the district court and again in 1936 in the US 
Supreme Court.70 You might have expected that level of litigation 
success to have consequences in the marketplace, but that doesn’t 
seem to have been the case. In January 1952, the US government 
again sued IBM, alleging that IBM had unlawfully restrained 
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and monopolized the tabulating equipment market, and by then 
IBM was up to a 90 percent market share.71 
With the benefit of hindsight, we know that the computer in-
dustry was really just getting started in January 1956. The new 
machines were perhaps ready to move out of the world of military 
and university operations into more general use. The 1950s were 
the early days of semiconductors and at the cusp of the creation 
of mainframe computers and a computing business. The com-
bined effect of the AT&T and IBM antitrust settlements seemed 
to open the door wide at just the right moment to enable robust 
competition over the new machines, and there was no obvious rea-
son to think that monopoly power would come to the computing 
market. 
III.  A COMPUTER MONOPOLY? 
A little more than a decade later, in 1967, IBM was the larg-
est US public firm by market capitalization with a value of $258.6 
billion in 2017 dollars (AT&T was still number two at $200.5 bil-
lion).72 IBM had successfully navigated the deep changes in tech-
nology from the world of tabulating machines that it had domi-
nated in the 1930s through vacuum tubes into the world of 
semiconductors and mainframe computers. And in January 1967, 
the US Justice Department began investigating IBM regarding 
possible violations of US antitrust laws.73 Press reports at the 
time put IBM’s market share in computers in the range of 70 per-
cent, with the next largest firm, Honeywell, at 7.4 percent.74 
Two years later, on January 17, 1969, in the very last days of 
the Lyndon B. Johnson administration, the United States an-
nounced that it had brought an antitrust suit against IBM alleg-
ing that IBM had monopolized the computer market in violation 
of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.75 IBM also faced a couple of new 
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private antitrust suits,76 but the suit with the US government 
promised to be epic. 
Roughly thirteen years had passed since the US govern-
ment’s settlements with AT&T and IBM. Whatever one thought 
of the strength of IBM’s market position in early 1969—the gov-
ernment believed that IBM had market power while IBM denied 
it—there can be little doubt that IBM’s position was driven at 
least in part by its bold introduction of its new IBM System/360 
on April 7, 1964.77 IBM was responding to growing competition in 
mainframe computers even as the market itself was growing rap-
idly.78 There is no guarantee that a leading firm will successfully 
ride its original position in one market into the next related evo-
lutionary step in the market, but IBM had done just that in tak-
ing its long-term, strong position in tabulating equipment into the 
new computer industry. Remington Rand had tried the same feat 
with its early UNIVAC computers; although it clearly took a mar-
ket lead in the new computer market as the first entrant, it didn’t 
have anything like IBM’s position in tabulating equipment.79 The 
DOJ antitrust complaint accused IBM of monopolizing the “gen-
eral purpose digital computer” industry in violation of Section 2 
of the Sherman Act.80 
A complaint of course is just an allegation of facts and possi-
ble misconduct. It doesn’t mean that anything in it is actually 
true, though DOJ is full of serious antitrust professionals and the 
government doesn’t bring Section 2 cases lightly. I am more in-
terested in how the prior antitrust actions (or inactions) shaped 
this moment than in trying to resolve exactly how much market 
power IBM may or may not have had in 1969.81 
As noted above, the US government first sued IBM in 1932, 
prevailed up the court ladder, and seemingly didn’t change mar-
ket outcomes in an important way. That led to the 1952 suit and 
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then the 1956 settlement. Part of this path may be related to the 
theory of the 1932 case, which was that IBM was impermissibly 
tying punch cards to its tabulating equipment.82 Tying consuma-
bles like punch cards has historically just been a way to price dis-
criminate as to the machine—here machines that IBM held pa-
tents on. Even if we ended the tying, all that would seem to lead 
to is greater competition in the cards market, but it isn’t obvious 
that that would change competition in the equipment market it-
self. Sometimes increased competition in an adjacent market can 
then feed back into more competition in the original market, but 
the tabulating equipment market was highly technical and filled 
with patents and might naturally have been blocked off from com-
petition in that market, at least until the market took a much 
larger discrete jump or was subsumed into something else.83 
That something else was computers. The tabulating ma-
chines were just tools for crunching data, and, by the standards 
of the day, they were good at that, but digital computers were go-
ing to be much better. Card readers were important for inputting 
data into computers, but building computers was a different un-
dertaking. IBM could have bungled that, but with the introduc-
tion of the System/360 in 1964, IBM instead had hit a home run. 
Note that the 1956 antitrust settlement didn’t block IBM 
from going into computers.84 That of course was the obvious next 
business for IBM, so it isn’t at all clear that IBM would have 
agreed to a settlement had the government sought to quarantine 
it. The 1956 settlement with IBM was designed to ease entry into 
the tabulating equipment market by other firms by increasing 
their access to IBM’s patents. The settlement even put in place a 
mechanism by which IBM might be forced to divest a chunk of its 
tabulating equipment business if it still controlled more than 
50 percent of that business seven years after the settlement.85 
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But it seems extraordinarily unlikely that IBM would have 
agreed not to operate in the new computer market. But that was 
exactly part of the deal that AT&T agreed to in 1956 to resolve its 
pending antitrust case. AT&T and IBM were differently situated, 
of course, as the government saw AT&T as being in a regulated 
natural monopoly business—the telephone system—and wanted 
to make sure that AT&T didn’t artificially cross-subsidize its com-
petitive position in computers from the regulated industry. 
But the cost of that restriction was to remove a potentially 
strong competitor from the computer market. It is impossible to 
know what the counterfactual world looks like in which AT&T 
builds computers in 1956. The mainframe computer was the nat-
ural successor to new digital computers of World War II, and the 
new transistor would reset how computers operated. This was a 
key point of competition for the new industry. 
The settlement barred AT&T from entering the new com-
puter market in an effort to control the possible distortion of com-
petition in the computer market that might have resulted from 
the presence of a firm operating a natural monopoly. In making 
that choice, the US government assumed different risks to en-
hance competition. We avoided the cross-subsidization risk but 
we accepted the risk of depriving the market of a potentially in-
novative competitor.  
Removing a competitor is probably unimportant if the market 
is competitive and the technology in play is relatively standard-
ized. But if the market is likely to be occupied by a few large firms, 
losing a strong competitor may meaningfully increase the chance 
that market power will arise. And we know that the technology 
in the computer market was in its infancy, and in excluding 
AT&T from the new market we were depriving that market of 
what may have been the most technologically sophisticated firm 
in the market. Had AT&T been allowed to enter the computer 
business, perhaps through a separate subsidiary with restrictions 
to try to manage the cross-subsidization problem, competition in 
the computer market might have looked quite different. 
But with AT&T on the sidelines, by 1969 the US government 
believed that IBM was monopolizing the computer market.86 One 
of the central claims in the complaint was that IBM was monop-
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olizing by not establishing separate charges for hardware, soft-
ware, and services; instead, consumers paid one price to IBM for 
all of those.87 The complaint alleged that this practice limited com-
petition, though exactly what that meant wasn’t crystal clear.88 
One theory might have been that it was difficult to sell software 
in competition with IBM if IBM gave all of its software away, and 
the same would have been true of related services. A second ver-
sion of the story, and the government might have been alleging 
both, is that by blocking the rise of independent software sellers 
and service providers, IBM was making it harder for its hardware 
competitors to compete. If there had been a robust independent 
software and services market, a hardware maker might have 
been able to specialize in hardware, but instead, in the world 
shaped by IBM’s policies, IBM’s competitors were forced to inte-
grate software and services. 
In June 1969, as the new government antitrust suit against 
IBM was really just getting going, IBM announced that it would 
unbundle hardware, software, and services.89 IBM told customers 
that it would cut hardware prices by 3 percent.90 It didn’t imme-
diately announce new prices for software and services, but a cor-
responding price for those would not have seemed to create much 
space for entry.91 It seems natural to attribute the change in 
IBM’s practices to the antitrust suit, though IBM had disclosed in 
December 1968 that it was considering making the change.92 Of 
course, the unbundling was amidst the ongoing antitrust investi-
gation of IBM, and that makes it quite hard to separate out pos-
sible independent business justifications for a switch from strate-
gic considerations directed toward a possible antitrust action. And 
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one of IBM’s economic experts would later dispute the idea that the 
antitrust suit had anything to do with the change in pricing.93 
IV.  THE 1982 BREAKUP OF AT&T 
On November 20, 1974, the United States brought a new an-
titrust action against AT&T as part of its long-running effort to 
regulate the company.94 The government was returning to the 
mission of the 1949 antitrust suit in seeking to separate Western 
Electric—AT&T’s equipment manufacturing company—from 
AT&T and even splitting Western Electric itself into pieces, but the 
new suit went beyond the 1949 suit in seeking to separate AT&T’s 
long-distance service from the local Bell operating companies.95 
It seemed that AT&T had grown too large to be regulated ef-
fectively by state and federal regulators.96 As the complaint made 
clear, AT&T continued to dominate US telecommunications, 
though in parts of the network it looked as if competition might 
be possible. The FCC had issued rulings in 1968 in the Carterfone 
proceeding and then again in 1969 in response to an application 
by a long-distance telephone entrant, MCI, which required AT&T 
to allow new devices to be attached to the network and which 
forced AT&T to interconnect with new competitors.97 The FCC 
ruling in favor of MCI was particularly noteworthy as it suggested 
that the FCC was open to the possibility of changing the basic 
structure of telephone rates, according to which lower local tele-
phone service prices were effectively subsidized by higher long-
distance charges. AT&T had characterized MCI as a “cream-
skimming” entrant, meaning that MCI was entering only because 
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it saw certain long-distance markets as attractive given the arti-
ficially high prices in those markets created by local/long-distance 
cross-subsidization.98 
Somewhat surprisingly, on January 8, 1982, the government 
and AT&T announced that the suit had settled and that AT&T 
would be broken up.99 After the dust had settled, in August 1983, 
the final changes of the breakup were nailed down, with the split 
to occur on January 1, 1984.100 Western Electric would remain in-
tact and AT&T would continue to own it, but the twenty-two local 
Bell operating companies would be split from the parent and 
seven new, large regional companies would be created to house 
the operating companies. These would become the RBOCs.101 
The new settlement, which was structured as a modification 
of the 1956 final judgment, reflected a series of trade-offs about 
how competition might work in the presence of a natural monopoly. 
The local telephone market was understood to remain a natural 
monopoly, and the restrictions imposed on the business activities 
of the new RBOCs reflected that.102 They were barred from the 
long-distance market, the equipment market, and potential new 
markets such as information services. Again, in each case, the 
choice was between losing a possible competitor versus adding a 
competitor who might have an advantaged position relative  
to other firms who did not have a business that was a natural  
monopoly. 
AT&T would be in the long-distance business, plus a key part 
of the deal was that the business line restrictions from the 1956 
final judgment would be lifted, though the district court judge 
hearing the case did add a restriction that delayed AT&T’s right 
to enter the information services business.103 And to ensure that 
AT&T didn’t somehow enjoy advantaged access to the local net-
works that would be required to complete long-distance calls, the 
RBOCs also were given nondiscrimination obligations such that 
they would need to treat an entrant into the long-distance market 
on par with the treatment given to AT&T.104 
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And AT&T itself was subject to a nondiscrimination rule.105 
Given that the scope of the AT&T long-distance market was likely 
to far exceed those of its competitors for an extended period of 
time, entrants into long-distance faced a real disadvantage re-
garding the scope of the service that they could offer.106 Giving 
those competitors access to AT&T’s infrastructure meant that a 
new firm could enter one segment and yet still offer customers 
much broader service because of their access to the AT&T long-
distance system. 
Why did AT&T agree to the deal? It was true that the trial 
wasn’t going well, but AT&T almost certainly understood that 
they might fare better on appeal.107 AT&T presumably believed 
that computers and communications were converging, and that it 
would be a strong competitor in that new combined market if it 
was free of the business line restrictions of the 1956 final judg-
ment. The firm may not have seen much potential growth in local 
telecommunications proper, which, after all, would remain a reg-
ulated natural monopoly. AT&T really had been at the cutting 
edge of computing when business computing was starting. It had 
missed the computing boom completely and IBM had become suf-
ficiently successful such that it was, at least in the eyes of the 
government, worthy of a complex monopolization case. AT&T had 
missed one computer competition, and presumably it did not want 
to miss the next one. 
V.  NEW COMPUTER MONOPOLIES? 
AT&T presumably thought that the computer market was 
changing. On August 12, 1981, IBM had introduced a new per-
sonal computer, the IBM PC.108 The 1969 antitrust case against 
IBM was then more than a decade old, and there was an assort-
ment of trial wrangling going on and possible efforts at settle-
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ment, but IBM was actually in the business of building comput-
ers, not litigating antitrust cases, and it was continuing to build 
new computers.109 
The computer industry understood the personal computer to 
be the third generation of computers. Mainframe computers like 
the IBM System/360 were considered the first generation and 
minicomputers such as those built by market leader Digital 
Equipment Corp (DEC) were considered computing’s second gen-
eration. DEC was started in 1957, had gone public in 1966, but 
still was a small fraction of IBM’s size at the time of the 1969 
antitrust suit.110 The personal computer—or microcomputer—was 
seen as the next generation of computing. Apple had introduced 
the Apple II in 1977, but it wasn’t quite clear what market was 
ready for the new device. Talking at a computer expo in Boston in 
August 1977, Steve Jobs was convinced that the personal com-
puter would become a consumer product, but he recognized that 
it wasn’t there quite yet.111 
IBM had been slow to pay attention to the minicomputer 
market and only entered at the end of July 1969.112 But IBM 
wanted to move faster on personal computers, and in August 
1980, IBM decided to build a personal computer, even though it 
was quite uncertain about the likely size of the market. It faced a 
core question about how closed or open the design of the new com-
puter would be, but it was quite clear that it would rely on at least 
some external components. One of the key internal backers of the 
project at IBM subsequently suggested that the open architecture 
was attractive in part because of the ongoing US government an-
titrust suit.113 
It is easy to forget that the IBM PC was released with three 
different operating systems and that when IBM initially ap-
proached Microsoft and asked Bill Gates and Paul Allen for an 
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operating system for the new PC, Gates and Allen referred IBM 
to Digital Research, and were furious when their contact there 
balked at IBM’s nondisclosure terms. How IBM ended up back at 
Microsoft is the stuff of legends, but the design choices made by 
IBM in relying on software from Microsoft and hardware from 
Intel turned those two firms into the leading computer firms of the 
personal computer era. When IBM clones emerged, IBM lost control 
of the personal computer market, and Microsoft and Intel rose.114 
Note the market dynamic there. Everything suggests that 
IBM’s entry into personal computers validated that market. 
IBM’s entrance was an insurance policy that it would back this 
new market. It seems clear that IBM’s entry into personal com-
puters in August 1981 powerfully shaped that market and, at 
least initially, IBM gained a substantial advantage in the young 
personal computer market.115 It is true that there were then 
young incumbent firms like Apple Computer that had meaningful 
market shares, but in reality, if we had calibrated those market 
shares based upon the size of the market that would emerge, they 
had very small positions. IBM’s brand was sufficiently powerful 
that it was effectively able to establish a new standard in those mar-
kets and thereby revolutionize the personal computer market.116 
Again, one could have imagined an antitrust remedy to the 
1969 lawsuit that would have made it harder for IBM to enter 
related computer markets and to limit the ability of IBM to ex-
tend its position in mainframes into this new computing market. 
An effective remedy of that sort would have diminished the cred-
ibility that IBM was able to confer on the new market. And the 
presence of the 1969 suit seems to have shaped the design of the 
IBM PC and then the competitive framework that would emerge 
from it. 
As Microsoft rose, governments in the United States and 
Europe got interested. A 1994 settlement addressed Microsoft’s 
licensing practices for MS-DOS, but nothing suggests that that 
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settlement altered the path of the computer industry or how Mi-
crosoft operated.117 Indeed, as Bill Gates put it right after the set-
tlement: “None of the people who run [Microsoft’s seven] divisions 
are going to change what they do or think or forecast. Nothing. 
Nothing. There’s one guy in charge of licenses. He’ll read the 
agreements.”118 
But as Microsoft and Intel rose, IBM went into freefall. IBM’s 
earnings before taxes were over $10 billion in 1990,119 but in 1991, 
they dropped to $121 million,120 before dropping further to a $9 
billion loss in 1992121 and an $8.8 billion loss in 1993.122 IBM 
changed CEOs, but while IBM had in some basic sense defined 
the personal computer in establishing a new standard, that 
standard had a name—Wintel—that made crystal clear who the 
real winners had been.123 And AT&T would spend billions of dol-
lars in an effort to gain ground in the computer market only to 
abandon those efforts in September 1995, when it announced an-
other breakup of the firm in which it spun off its acquired com-
puter assets into a new firm.124 
But if the government couldn’t alter how Microsoft operated, 
a new competitor could. Netscape went public on August 9, 1995, 
but Gates saw clearly the threat that Netscape posed and de-
scribed it in great detail in his famous May 26, 1995 Internet 
Tidal Wave memo.125 Netscape and the Internet more generally 
threatened to turn Windows into, as Bill Gates put it, a commod-
ity. The personal computer was going to get subsumed into 
something much larger, and that threatened Microsoft’s posi-
tion. Microsoft responded aggressively to Netscape to try to pro-
tect its position in operating systems.126 
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On May 18, 1998, the US government filed an epic new an-
titrust suit against Microsoft.127 Microsoft would lose that case 
and be faced with a potential breakup of the firm.128 On appeal, 
in June 2001, the en banc DC Circuit unanimously ruled that 
Microsoft had violated Section 2 by illegally maintaining its  
operating system monopoly.129 In the same decision, however,  
Microsoft was able to reverse a number of the lower court’s liabil-
ity findings, and the DC Circuit found the remedy phase of the 
case procedurally inadequate.130 On remand, in November 2001, 
the DOJ reached a much more modest settlement with Microsoft 
that did not involve a breakup of the firm, and a federal district 
court judge would later bless that settlement.131 
But as Microsoft was resolving the US antitrust actions 
against it, the EC stepped in to accuse the firm of violating the 
applicable European dominance rules. On August 1, 2000, the EC 
issued an initial statement of objections against Microsoft regard-
ing Windows and server software interoperability, and the case 
expanded on August 30, 2001 when the EC sent a second state-
ment of objections that alleged that Microsoft was impermissibly 
tying Windows Media Player to Windows. On March 24, 2004, the 
EC concluded that Microsoft had indeed abused its dominant po-
sition and engaged in illegal tying. The EC imposed a fine of 
€497 million and further ordered Microsoft to offer computer 
makers two different versions of Windows, one with Windows Me-
dia Player and one without.132 
In January 2009, the EC would take one more step with re-
gard to Microsoft. The EC believed that Microsoft was impermis-
sibly tying Internet Explorer to Windows. Microsoft presumably 
didn’t want to delay the introduction of Windows 7 in Europe, and 
rather than fight, Microsoft settled. The settlement implemented 
a must-carry remedy requiring that a new European Windows 
computer user would be presented with the browser ballot (or 
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browser choice) screen. The user would be asked to choose from 
one of fourteen presented browsers.133 There was some irony  
in that result, as part of the original case in the United States  
was predicated on the idea that seeing two icons for browsers con-
fused users, but perhaps the world had become more sophisticated 
by 2009. 
Looking at the remedies against Microsoft as a group, the 
original breakup remedy in the US case was once again an effort 
to change competition going forward based on creating separate 
new firms. AT&T of course had agreed to this in 1982, and that 
makes it hard to generalize from that situation to one in which 
divestiture would be imposed as a remedy. Firms spin off divi-
sions and otherwise voluntarily break up with some frequency, so 
it isn’t as if firms aren’t cleaved in two, but obviously what is 
much more unusual is forced separation. 
The European Microsoft remedies sidestepped the forced sep-
aration problem by instead conducting direct product engineer-
ing: first by ordering the creation of multiple versions of Windows 
and then by creating a kind of must-carry remedy on the Internet 
browser. Of course, lots of products fail in the marketplace, but if 
you believed, as the EC clearly did, that Microsoft had distorted 
competition over media players through its tying, then creating a 
product offering that gives computer makers a real choice would 
let the competitive process run without choosing the result of 
that process. Microsoft undoubtedly incurred costs in managing 
both versions of the product, but those presumably were modest. 
All of that said, the market itself spoke decisively. In April 2005, 
Microsoft issued a fact sheet on Windows XP sales. In the period 
that Microsoft sold 35.5 million copies in Europe of Windows with 
Windows Media Player, it sold 1,787 copies of Windows without it.134 
And there is a more basic way in which the EC’s theory of the 
case failed. The EC was concerned that Microsoft was trying to 
leverage its position in operating systems into the adjacent media 
player market. Given the fact that the imposed remedy didn’t 
block Microsoft from distributing its media player, the EC should 
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have predicted that Microsoft would have succeeded in the media 
market. We know of course that this didn’t happen. Apple re-
leased the iPod in October 2001, and in so doing changed the fate 
of Apple completely.135 
And on browsers, even though Microsoft had been able to 
thwart Netscape, it isn’t clear that the European browser ballot 
mattered in an important way. In January 2009, Internet Ex-
plorer had roughly 73 percent of the market in the United States, 
while the corresponding figure in Europe was just over 50 per-
cent. Ten years later, in January 2018, Microsoft’s browser mar-
ket share in the United States was only 4.5 percent, while it was 
down to 3.1 percent in Europe.136 Microsoft’s position in browsers 
had collapsed over the decade, but it had done so everywhere, 
including where there was no EC-enforced browser ballot. And 
Microsoft had also abandoned the Internet Explorer brand and 
had adopted a new browser, Microsoft Edge.137 
CONCLUSION 
In 2017, the five largest US public firms by market capitali-
zation were the firms we most associate with computers and 
online life today: Apple at number one, with a value of $898 bil-
lion; Alphabet (Google), second at $719 billion; Microsoft, third at 
$644 billion; Amazon, fourth at $543 billion; and Facebook, fifth 
at $518 billion.138 Fifty years earlier, in 1967, the largest firm by 
market capitalization had been IBM and AT&T had been second, 
and 100 years earlier, in 1917, AT&T had been the second most 
valuable public firm in the United States.139 
It is hard to know exactly how much the pair of suits against 
AT&T and IBM shaped the computing era. The 1956 AT&T final 
judgment solidified the rules regarding AT&T’s critical transistor 
patents and knowhow, though entrants were getting access to 
those already absent the final judgment. The final judgment itself 
didn’t change access to the transistor patents and knowhow, but 
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of course it could have prevented AT&T from later changing 
course on the access that it had already created. The 1956 final 
judgment blocked AT&T from entering the computer industry at 
a key point in its evolution. And that fact, coupled with the fact 
that the 1956 IBM final judgment didn’t block IBM from entering 
mainframe computers, instead allowing it to continue to hold its 
dominant position in tabulating equipment, all seemed to smooth 
IBM’s emergence as the leading computer company of the main-
frame era. The fact that the System/360 was a great computer 
didn’t hurt either. 
The 1974 suit against AT&T showed the powerful ongoing ef-
fects of the 1956 final judgment. The line of business restrictions 
in the 1956 AT&T final judgment played an important if not de-
cisive role in AT&T’s willingness to settle the 1974 case. The com-
ing convergence of computers and communications meant that 
AT&T wanted the opportunity to extend its strong position into 
the coming converged market. It failed dismally in multiple at-
tempts to do so. And the actual breakup of AT&T in 1984 perhaps 
mattered most when telecommunications made a generational 
shift from wired to wireless as the presence of large telecommu-
nications firms changed competition over the new wireless me-
dium. In the new material in the 1993 reprint of The Antitrust 
Paradox, Bork thought that the result in the AT&T case was sen-
sible, a change perhaps from his perspective in the original text. 
That said, Bork saw AT&T as a special case given the presence of 
the regulated natural monopoly. 
In his new 1993 epilogue to The Antitrust Paradox, Bork de-
scribed his days as Solicitor General—from 1973 to 1977—and 
from that vantage point, he saw the IBM case as the “Antitrust 
Division’s Vietnam.”140 As might be expected given that charac-
terization, Bork applauded the 1982 dismissal of the IBM case. 
Yet the core violation described in the original 1969 complaint—
the bundling of hardware, software, and services—went away 
early in the case. Perhaps it would have, absent the lawsuit, but 
it is hard to know for sure. And the fact that the 1969 suit was 
pending when IBM released its new personal computer in August 
1981 is likely to have shaped the open design that IBM chose for 
the machine, which in turn may have led to the rise of Microsoft 
and Intel.141 These are antitrust shadows at work. 
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As to Microsoft, the US government settled its first case 
against Microsoft in 1994 and nothing suggests that accom-
plished much of anything. The 1998 browser case was a decisive 
legal victory for the government, but the remedy in the case didn’t 
somehow restore the competitive path that the industry had pur-
portedly been on before Microsoft violated Section 2. But even if 
antitrust failed to accomplish that end and to restore Netscape’s 
rising position in the new industry, the technology itself prevailed 
as the Internet grew into the platform we have today. Microsoft 
successfully used its monopoly position in operating systems to 
preserve its position in the desktop market, but in a world in 
which the internet became the main platform, the personal com-
puter would play a much smaller role. That said, Microsoft has 
clearly recovered and has been able to ride to success in the cloud. 
Finally, the European efforts to cabin Microsoft’s position 
have on the whole been ineffective. It isn’t clear that the browser 
ballot remedy has had important effects on browser market 
shares. And the earlier Windows Media player case didn’t obvi-
ously change competitive results in any real way. And yet not-
withstanding this ineffective enforcement, the fear that Microsoft 
would leverage its position in computer operating systems into 
media never really materialized. The October 2001 release of the 
iPod by Apple made sure of that, and the iPod, a product seem-
ingly uninfluenced by the long reach of antitrust, was essential 
for creating the world we live in today. The iPod takes us to the 
iPhone and that in turn became the critical interface to the world 
of cloud computing and the datacenters that drive it. 
And while the Microsoft case came too late to make it even 
into the new material in the 1993 reprint, Bork would have a 
chance to express his views on the case. After his nomination to 
the US Supreme Court was rejected, Bork eventually left the 
bench and in 1998 he became one of Netscape’s lawyers. The great 
job of being a lawyer in litigation is that the answer is clear—your 
client should win—though the reasons for that can sometimes be 
tricky to articulate. But Bork presumably agreed to work for 
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Netscape because he believed in the firm’s position and so it is 
hardly surprising to learn that Bork believed that “the case of mo-
nopolization against Microsoft is cold.”142 
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